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i 
ABSTRACT 
We are in an era where organizations are increasingly producing a huge amount of data 
to be analyzed, resulting in sheer attraction towards cloud computing. However, 
outsourcing data to the cloud has a risk of its abuse or leakage. Thus, we address the 
problem of delegating query processing on outsourced private datasets while 
maintaining privacy. In this study, we consider a scenario which includes two data 
owners outsourcing their datasets to a cloud service. The cloud performs a set union 
computation and the querier sends a query to obtain information from the two datasets. 
This scenario is useful in the field where data owners are highly concerned about the 
privacy of data and wants to keep the contents confidential, on the other hand, a 
researcher wants to retrieve a result from a group of similar organizations. Besides, the 
researcher obtains the result without learning anything about the source or content of 
data. Here, we propose a protocol in which we use fully homomorphic encryption 
(FHE) and Cartesian-join of Bloom filters (CBF) proposed by Wang et al. to compute 
the set union operation on multi-attribute datasets while not revealing any information 
related to the datasets besides the result. The protocol obtains the information on 
whether a particular set of elements exists or not without learning about the residing 
source. To the best of our knowledge our protocol is the first approach for outsourced 
set union operations adopting FHE and CBF matrix, which is the novelty of this study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Excessive dependence on electronic information has caused a rapid increase in sensitive data 
that are stored and processed in the cyberspace. Consequently, an efficient cryptographic 
technique such as private set union (PSU) is needed to allow information sharing and privacy 
protection.  
Private set union (PSU) [1] is a cryptographic protocol that allows multiple parties to privately 
join their datasets without revealing anything except what can be deduced from the result of 
the computation eliminating the duplicates. For instance, when a research group wants to gather 
information from multiple hospitals, a set union protocol is used to produce only the union 
result, omitting duplicate patients without learning the identity of the patients. Generally, PSU 
computations are done at the client side, causing computations at the client side to become 
expensive when dealing with large datasets. Thus, moving sensitive datasets to a cloud service 
has been chosen as a preferred solution by many clients for its reduced computation cost at the 
client side. The process of delegating the data storage and computation to the cloud is called 
outsourced private set union (OPSU). Although cloud services have many advantages, they are 
not always trustable, causing security and privacy issues.  
After the delegation of data to the cloud, it is important to provide a method to securely 
compute and execute queries while maintaining the data privacy. One of the methods of 
achieving the privacy of outsourced data is to encrypt the whole data. However, in traditional 
encryption schemes such as AES or DES, the encrypted data must be decrypted first in order 
to perform query processing or computation. Thus, in the case of outsourced data, the above-
mentioned scheme is not safe, causing security issues. Therefore, the challenge becomes the 
realization of computation while guaranteeing the security of outsourced data. To eliminate 
this challenge, we adopt fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [4], which supports arbitrary 
computations in the encrypted state so that the data owners can securely outsource their datasets 
to the cloud server for computation over sensitive data without revealing any information. 
Private query processing is an interesting problem that has attracted incredible interest in the 
field of both cryptography and database. In this study, we focus on query processing to  answer  
whether an element with a given attribute values belong to a given set. Query processing with 
standard Bloom filter on a multi-attribute dataset cannot verify the relationship among the 
attributes in an item as a standard Bloom filter treats each attribute independently. Since the 
standard Bloom filter is just a bit representation of a dataset, storing all the attributes in the 
same filter cannot explain their relation. For example, X ={a, b} and Y={c, d} are sets with 
two attributes each. We insert each element of a set in a standard Bloom filter and we want to 
know if a set {a, b} exist in the filter or not. However, the filter cannot distinguish whether the 
values a and b exist as a set or as independent values, and thus returns the result based on an 
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assumption that they are independent. Therefore, to verify such relation between multi-attribute 
datasets, Wang et al. proposed a Cartesian-join of Bloom filters (CBF) [11]. 
In this study, we focus on the computation of PSU on outsourced multi-attribute datasets and 
query processing with FHE using CBF matrix while maintaining the data privacy in the cloud 
server. In particular, we consider a scenario where two data owners outsource their datasets to 
the cloud. The cloud performs PSU computation on the datasets followed by receiving a query 
from a querier to answer whether a data which consists of the same attribute set with the query 
is included in the set or not.  
We propose a secure protocol for set union operations at the cloud, based on the idea of OPSU, 
with CBF [11] and FHE. The novelty of our proposed protocol is that, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first approach for outsourced union operation performed on multi-attribute 
datasets for searching the existence of attribute pair of the item adopting FHE. 
 
1.1. Motivating Applications 
One potential scenario is that a social service organization in a city wants to determine the 
welfare amount for the senior-residents residing in old-age homecare centers. However, the 
old-age homecare centers do not want to reveal any information on the senior citizens. 
Furthermore, there is the case where the senior citizens are registered in multiple old-age homes, 
resulting in duplicate data. This scenario is partially inspired by [1]. 
In this scenario, we consider multiple old-age home centers, each possessing a medical history 
and other information on the senior citizens. Due to the privacy issues, the old-age home centers 
do not intend to share any information among each other but wants to provide information, 
such as existence of a senior citizen matching a query, to the social service organization based 
on their queries without leaking any other information. 
More precisely, we assume the old-aged home A possesses a database 𝑑𝑏A with table 𝑇A (id, 
age, diagnosis) and old-aged home B possesses a database 𝑑𝑏B with table 𝑇B (id, age, diagnosis). 
For example, the querier wants to know if  there exist senior citizens of age 65, that are admitted 
in the old-age centers suffering from cancer or any specific disease without having prior 
information about existence of the information. The following is an example of such query. 
SELECT CASE WHEN EXISTS 
 ( SELECT  * FROM 𝑇$, 𝑇% 
    WHERE diagnosis = “Cancer” and Age = 65 ) 
THEN CAST(1 AS BIT) 
ELSE CAST(0 AS BIT) END 
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Here, we refer to old-age home centers as data owners and a social service organization as a 
querier. Furthermore, we assume that the querier does not perform large computations and 
delegates the query processing to a cloud server. Thus, our objective is to build a protocol that 
computes a set union over multi-attribute datasets and allows the querier to know if the query 
exists in the computed union set. The motivating scenario is shown in Figure 1. The formal 
model of our protocol is described in Section 4.  
 
Figure 1: Motivating Scenario 
 
1.2. Organization 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized mainly in 7 sections. The background of fully homomorphic 
encryption, Bloom filter and its variant, and the private set union and its variant are introduced 
in section 2. Similarly, related work are discussed in section 3 which is divided into two sub-
sections private computation and private queries. In Section 4 and 5, our problem settings, 
privacy requirements and our secure protocol achieving the private set union operations at the 
cloud are described. In Section 6, the implementation and evaluation of our protocol are shown. 
This thesis is concluded in Section 7.  
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Notations 
 
We define the notations used throughout this study in Table 2-1 
 
Table 2-1  Notations 
Notation Description 𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝑰  The Ith Data Owner   𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑰 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟8′s data whose size is 𝑛8 𝒎𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊  Optimal size of ith attribute bloom filter where 
i=1,2...,d 𝒌𝒐𝒑𝒕 Optimal number of hash functions 
H={ h0,...,hk-1} Set of k hash functions 𝒇𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒕 Optimal false positive rate 𝒏𝒐𝒑𝒕 The maximum size of a dataset  𝝀 Security parameter 𝜶 Minimal noise parameter 𝒑 Number of ciphertext in a single encrypted CBF 
matrix 
ABFi ith  number of attribute bloom filter, i= 1,...,d 
d Number of attributes (dimension) in a dataset 
[𝑏C,C, … , 𝑏C,FGHIJ ] A bit vector with length 𝑚LMNO  of d dimension 
[enc(𝑏C,C), … , 𝑒𝑛𝑐(	𝑏C,FGHIJ )] An encrypted bit vector with length 𝑚LMNO  of d dimesion 𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒃𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕 An encrypted bit vector result 
 
 
2.2. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) 
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic method that enables computations on encrypted 
data without decrypting it. However, this scheme only supports limited operations of only 
additions or only multiplications. Thus, the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) was 
proposed by Gentry [2] in 2009, which enables operations such as addition and multiplication, 
supporting arbitrary computations in  the ciphertext. Shortly after the development of the first 
FHE scheme, extensive research has been carried out on the design, implementation and 
cryptanalysis of FHE.  
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Gentry [2] introduced the FHE scheme based on ideal lattices. FHE can perform an arbitrary 
number of additions and multiplications on encrypted data. To guarantee the security, noise is 
incorporated to the ciphertext. The noise grows after each homomorphic operation. When the 
size of the noise exceeds a threshold, it leads to decryption errors. This results in limited 
number of homomorphic operations. However, Gentry was able to reduce the growth of noise 
by proposing the bootstrapping technique which can periodically refresh the ciphertexts by 
running a decryption function homomorphically.  
In 2018, Chilloti [6] introduced fast fully homomorphic encryption over torus (TFHE) which 
encrypts a single bit and evaluates the ciphertext with bootstrapping using symmetric key 
encryption. This scheme follows the line of work initiated by Gentry, Sahai and Waters (GSW) 
[7] which is Ring variant of Learning With Errors (RingLWE).  It is an improved FHE version 
of [5]. In [5], bootstrapping can compute one-bit operation in less than a second while [6] 
reduced to the bootstrapping time 13ms per single bit operation. The gate bootstrapping 
algorithm is implemented in the TFHE library [21]. This scheme allows data to be 
homomorphically packed, unpacked, repacked and moved across the slots which is a space that 
stores multiple plaintexts  in a ciphertext for speeding up the computations. In our work we 
will be adopting THFE library for it introduces improved gate based bootstrapping algorithm.	
2.2.1.  TFHE scheme 
 
The TFHE scheme have following parameters and algorithms: 
• Setup(1λ , 𝟏𝜶 ) → 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒔 : Given a security parameter 𝜆  and minimal noise 
parameter 𝛼, it outputs a set of encryption parameters   
 
• KeyGen(𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒔) : Given the set of parameters params, a secret key sk and evaluation 
key ek is generated. 
 
• Encrypt(𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒔, 𝒔𝒌, 𝝁) : Given the secret key sk and a message 𝜇, it produces a 
ciphertext c, which is the encryption of 𝜇 
 
• Decrypt(𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒔, 𝒔𝒌, c) : Given the secret key sk and a ciphertext c, it produces a 
message m, which is the decryption of c.  
 
 
2.3. Private set union 
Private set union (PSU) [1,12,13] is a cryptographic technique that allows two parties to 
compute a union of two datasets without revealing anything except the union. Below we 
introduce a PSU variant: outsourced private set union (OPSU).  
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2.3.1. Outsourced private set union 
Outsourced private set union (OPSU) is a variant of PSU, which allows delegation of PSU 
computation on private datasets that are outsourced to an untrusted cloud server. Traditionally, 
in PSU, two parties jointly compute the set union using locally stored datasets. Moreover, the 
computation of set union is high as it deals with the accumulation of datasets while eliminating 
the duplicates. Thus, with increasing dataset size, the delegation of dataset storage to a cloud 
service becomes a preferred solution. However, because the cloud server is run by an external 
third party, private information may be revealed to the third party, violating the privacy 
agreements. Thus, OPSU is a setting which computes the set union of the outsourced datasets  
without revealing the contents and computation result of the outsourced data to the third party 
[16]. 
 
2.4. Bloom filter (BF) 
 
A Bloom filter (BF) [9] is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure to test whether an 
element 𝑥	is present in a set 𝑆. A BF represents a set 𝑆 = {𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , ... , 𝑥𝑛 } of n elements from 
a large universe 𝑈 of an m bits array. Initially, m bits of array 𝐵𝐹 are set to 0. It uses k 
independent hash functions 𝐻 = {h0, h1, ... , h𝑘−1}, in order to add each element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 into a BF, 
all ℎj(𝑥) are set to 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟	∀	ℎj , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 − 1. After each element in 𝑆 is added to a BF, we 
obtain an array that represents the set S. To check if an item 𝑦 is in 𝑆, we check whether all ℎj(𝑦) are set to 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟	∀ℎj , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 − 1.If any bit  ℎj(𝑦) are set to 0, the element 𝑦 is not 
included in 𝑆. While if all the bits are set to 1, we assume the elements are present in 𝑆 which 
may yield a false positive, fp. However, the BF does not produce false negative. 
The probability of elements not present in the set or a false positive probability, fp, of all bits 
in a BF is still 0 is expressed as: 
   𝑓𝑝 = (1 − 1 𝑚v )wx 	≈ 	 e{|}~                                       (1) 
Further, false positive probability, fp, of a bloom filter can be minimized by using the optimized  
number of hash functions, k, optimized size of the BF, m, and the optimized number of elements, 
n, in a set. It is expressed by:  
𝑓𝑝 = (1 − (1 − 1 𝑚v )wx)w 	≈ (1 −	e{|}~)w                                  (2) 
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2.4.1. Attribute Bloom filter (ABF) 
 
Attribute bloom filter (ABF) [10] is a  Bloom filter which is separated based on the attribute 
of an item, i.e. one Bloom filter represents one dimension in a d-dimensional dataset. All the 
attribute Bloom filter uses the same k number of hash functions. Initially, a 𝑚j	bit array of an 
ABF is set as 0. In Figure 2, we show an example in which a three-dimensional dataset is 
represented as three BFs, each representing an attribute. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example showing ABF 
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2.4.2.  Cartesian-join of Bloom Filters (CBF)   
A CBF [11] is a space-efficient storage structure for multi-attribute datasets. It is constructed 
by obtaining cartesian products from d-dimensional ABF in order to maintain the inner 
relationship between different attributes of a dataset. We give a brief description on CBF below. 
 CBF construction consists of three steps:  Initialization, Update, and Check. 
Initialization: Here, one Bloom filter is used to represent one attribute ∀𝑎j, where 0 < 𝑖 < 𝑑, 
where each 𝑎j has n number of elements in d-dimensional dataset S. This BF is called attribute 
Bloom filter (ABF). The length of each 𝐴𝐵𝐹j, is 𝑚𝑖 , where i=1,..,d. All the 𝑚𝑖 bit vector of 𝐴𝐵𝐹j	is set to 0. Initialization of the 𝐴𝐵𝐹j is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Showing initialization of ABFs 
Further, to avoid the loss of relation among the attributes of an item, a CBF matrix is created 
by obtaining the cartesian product of ABF for i=1,..,d as in Equation (3). The CBF matrix is a 𝑚C ×	𝑚j bit vector, all initialized to 0. The construction of the CBF is shown in Figure 4, 
where d=2. 
B𝐹M  = 𝐴𝐵𝐹1 ×𝐴𝐵𝐹2 ×...×𝐴𝐵𝐹𝑑 
= {A ∣ A = (𝑎C, 𝑎, ..., 𝑎O), 𝑎j ∈ [0, 𝑚𝑖)}                               (3) 
 
Figure 4: Construction of the cartesian-join of Bloom filter (CBF) 
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Update: Now the insertion of d-dimensional item A={𝑎C, 𝑎,… , 𝑎} in an empty CBF matrix 
is illustrated in this step. As mentioned in initialization step, each attribute has same k number 
of hash function, thus, the hash functions group for each dimension d is defined as 	H ={hCC, hC, hC, … , h}  where i = 1, … , d . We use each hash functions group 	H(𝑎) ={hC(𝑎), h(𝑎), h(𝑎), … , h(𝑎)}	for	all	i = 1,… , d, to	 obtain hash results. Each hash 
function group {𝐻1(𝑎1),𝐻2(𝑎2),...,𝐻𝑑(𝑎𝑑)} produces their independent k hash functions. Then, 
from each group, the first hash result is selected, for instance, {h11(𝑎1)} {h21(𝑎2)} ... {h𝑑1(𝑎𝑑)}. 
The selected hash result is combined to form a d-dimensional index data point 
(h11(𝑎1),h21(𝑎2),...,h𝑑1(𝑎𝑑)). The corresponding data point in a CBF is set to 1. The same process 
is applied to rest of the  hash results until k hash result index points are set to 1. Figure 5 shows 
an example of the data structure and item insertion in to a CBF matrix when dimension d=2.  
 
Figure 5: Item Insertion in CBF[11] 
Check: In this step, d-dimension attributes of the item to be queried is provided. Suppose a 
query q = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, ..., 𝑞𝑑), query 𝑞i is not empty. Then, the same hash function groups as in  
above step is used to generate the hash results of the item’s attributes 	𝐻j(𝑞j) ={ℎjC(𝑞j), ℎj(𝑞j),… , ℎjw(𝑞j)}	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑑. Then, hash results index points are combined 
in the same process as in step Update, to form a query index data points. Then, checks if all the 
query data points obtained is set to 1 in CBF matrix. If a point is set to 1, we assume the queried 
item exists in the set, otherwise does not exist in the set. 
Given the attribute, attribute bloom filters 𝐴𝐵𝐹j	 with size 𝑚j	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑑	and hash number 
k. The false positive probability, 𝑓𝑝, of all bit vector in the CBF is still 0 is:  𝑓𝑝 = 1 − 1 − 1 𝑚C𝑚…𝑚Ov wxw ≈ 	 1 − 𝑒{wx FF…FJv 	w																																	 (4) 
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3. RELATED WORK 
 
In this section, the related work is divided into two categories: private computation and private 
queries 
 
3.1. Private Computation 
In [15], Miyaji et al.(2018) proposes a multiparty private set union (MPSU) protocol which 
allows multiple parties to jointly compute the union of their private datasets. However, the 
protocol eliminate the need of third party such as cloud. Further, Miyaji introduces duplicated 
Bloom filter (DBF) which is a variant of a counting Bloom filter (CBF). CBF results the 
maximum number of duplications of elements in the set while DBF increases the probability 
of computing the number of duplicates correctly and accurately. The number of duplicate items 
in the union is counted by only one party, 𝑃j, 𝑖 is the number of parties present and the union 
computation of CBF and DBF is outsourced to  O, an outsourcing provider. For the perspective 
of the security, the protocol uses additive homomorphic encryption scheme. However, since a 
party 𝑃j encrypts and outsources the bloom filters for the purpose of union computation, data 
storage outsourcing is not supported by the protocol .  
In [16], Tajima et al.(2018) proposed a basic protocol and querier-friendly protocol adopting 
the new functionality of outsourced private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) using a Bloom 
filter and BGV-style FHE scheme. Bloom filter is used for the representation of the elements 
of the set. Further, the data storage is outsourced to the third party such as cloud. Upon the 
queriers request the PSI computation is performed by the cloud in the data stored with the less 
computation time and communication cost. However, the size of each outsourced dataset is 
revealed to the cloud server which does not make it fully private. 
3.2. Private queries 
In 2017, Saha et al. [19] considered the problem of processing private database queries over 
encrypted data in the cloud and proposed a protocol for a conjunctive and disjunctive query 
processing. The protocol allows a client to process private queries using a ring learning with 
errors (RLWE)-based somewhat homomorphic encryption in the semi-honest model. It 
improves the performance of processing private conjunctive and disjunctive queries with a 
low-depth equality circuits compared to [17]. To achieve the low-depth equality circuit, the 
packing methods of [18] was modified in order to support efficient batch computations with a 
few multiplications which reduced the communication complexity. Although the 
implementation of the protocol shows that it is faster than [17] for both the conjunctive and 
disjunctive query processing along with a better security level, the protocols are not enough to 
handle the large database for many equality queries. 
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We summarize the related works and compare them to our protocol in Table 3-1. In the Table, 
Computation privacy means that the third party such as cloud does not learn anything about 
the computed result. Outsourcing data storage means that dataset is outsourced to a trusted 
third party such as a cloud for storage purpose. And query processing means that queries 
consists of given attribute value to achieve a result based on the query. In our protocol, we 
compute the set union while protecting the data privacy by totally hiding the dataset size from 
the cloud and supporting outsourced data storage and query processing. 
 
` 
Properties [15] [16] [19] ours 
Computation 
privacy ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Outsourcing 
data storage  
 ✓  ✓ 
Query 
processing   ✓ ✓ 
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4. MODEL 
 
First, we present our problem setting in this section. Our scenario consists of four parties: a 
data owner A, data owner B, querier Q and cloud server S. The data owner A and data owner 
B owns dataset DA and dataset DB, respectively. In the scenario as shown in the Figure 6, old-
age Home A and old-age Home B are considered as two data owners that have the datasets DA  
and DB respectively. Each data owner encrypts its dataset using a secret key sk, then the 
encrypted datasets are outsourced to the cloud server S. Here, the data owners do not want to  
reveal any information related to their datasets. The querier Q then requests the cloud server S 
to process queries to obtain  the encrypted bit vector result which indicates matched result is 
included in the union of 𝐷$ and 𝐷%. The querier Q decrypts the returned result using the secret 
key, sk. In this scenario, we assume the cloud service providers to be honest-but-curious, i.e. 
they follow the protocols but are curious to learn additional information about the residing data. 
The security requirements of our considered adversarial model are as follows: 
 
Data owner security: Each 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟8 learns nothing about the contents owned by other 
data owners, the query or the result. 
Server security: The server learns nothing about the result or the contents of outsourced data, 
and is only responsible for the computations and query processing 
Querier security: The querier only learns the query result. No information, other than the result, 
should be obtained. 
 
To initiate a set union operation, we adopt a variant of Bloom filter called Cartesian-join of 
Bloom Filters (CBF) [11] for outsourced PSU with FHE. The outsourced PSU is a protocol in 
which the cloud computes the set union of outsourced datasets privately without revealing any 
other information. 
 
 
Figure 6: Proposed Scenario 
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5. METHOD 
In this section, we propose our protocol. In order to perform outsourced private set union 
(OPSU) operation on multi-attribute datasets, we adopt FHE and CBF matrix [11], a variant of 
Bloom filter which can verify the relation among attributes in an item on multi-attribute dataset. 
The OPSU functionality is defined as a protocol where the cloud computes the set union 
operation on outsourced datasets and returns the set union.   
5.1. Overview 
Figure 7 shows the overview of our protocol. The basic idea of our protocol is as follows: 
i.  Initially, in the setup phase, the querier Q generates the secret key sk and evaluation 
key ek using the Setup, KeyGen algorithm of TFHE scheme. Then, sk and ek is 
distributed to data owners and the cloud server respectively by Q. Here, sk is sent to 
both data owner A and data owner B. 
 
ii. Each data owner creates a cartesian-join of Bloom filter (CBF) matrix. The querier is 
responsible for creating the hash functions, which is distributed to each data owner in 
order to insert elements into the CBF matrix. Each dimension generates k number of 
hash results, each hash results from each attribute is joined to form an index data point. 
The resulted index data point is set to 1 in the CBF matrix.  
 
iii. Each data owner encrypts its CBF matrix using the sk and stores them in the cloud.  
 
iv. In the cloud, the set union of the CBF matrices is computed which we represent as 𝐶𝐵𝐹∪ because we do not want to reveal  information about the data source or content 
to the cloud or querier Q. 
 
v. In the query phase, the Q sends a query to the cloud to obtain the existence of the data 
consisting the element set such as {𝑞C, 𝑞O}. 
 
vi. After the cloud receives the query {𝑞C, 𝑞O}, the cloud searches 𝐶𝐵𝐹∪ to retrieve an 
encrypted bit value as a result and sends the result to Q.  
 
vii. Finally, Q decrypts the result with sk to obtain bit value of 0 or 1. 
 
  
 
14 
 
 
Figure 7: Overview of our protocol 
 
5.2. Our protocol 
In this section, we describe our protocol in detail. 
 
5.2.1. Encrypted Cartesian-join of Bloom filter (CBF) Matrix 
We describe how to create an encrypted CBF matrix using TFHE scheme [6, 21]. As described 
in Section 2.4, a Bloom filter is obtained as a set representation, similarly, a CBF matrix is a 
BF variant, thus, we create them as a bit set representation in order to achieve our outsourced 
data storage model. 
In order to create a CBF matrix, we first determine the optimal number of hash function 𝑘LMN 
and optimal size of bit array for each ABF 𝑚LMNj for each 	𝐴𝐵𝐹i, where 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑑, using the 
following Equations (5) and (6) which is similar to the equations used in [16] and [11], 
respectively. We set an upper bound of dataset as 𝑛LMN and a desirable optimal false positive 
rate as 𝑓𝑝LMN , where 𝑛LMNis set by the cloud server and 𝑓𝑝LMN  by the querier. The probability of 
false positive can be reduced or kept optimal, if the number of data that each data owner 
outsources to the cloud is less than 𝑛LMN.Then, the size of the CBF matrix 𝑚LMN$££ 	can be 
determined using Equation (7).   
𝑚LMNj = 	−	xGHI ¤¥¦§MGHI¤¥¦()                                    (5) 
𝑘LMN = 		FGHI FGHI ……FGHIJxGHI log(2)                         (6)    𝑚LMN$££ =	 𝑚LMN	C ×	𝑚LMN × …×𝑚LMNO                   (7) 
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After the parameters are defined, we create an empty CBF matrix using Equation (3) in section 
2.4.2.  
Right after an empty CBF matrix is created, the data owner inserts the attribute set of the dataset 
into the CBF matrix using Algorithm 5-1. The general method of updating or inserting the 
element in the CBF matrix is the same as described in section 2.4.2.  
 
Subsequently, all the elements are inserted into the CBF matrix, the data owner encrypts it with 
the FHE secret key, sk, using Algorithm 5-2. The FHE secret key, sk, and a CBF matrix is 
taken as an input by the function to create an encrypted CBF matrix. The resulted encrypted 
matrix consists of an element composed of p ciphertexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 5-1:  Data Owner Algorithm to insert attribute set of the dataset   𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒂𝒊 in 
a CBF matrix 
Input: 	𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐭	𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐚𝒊	𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠	𝐨𝐟	{𝒂𝟏, . . , 𝒂𝐝}	𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬	𝐨𝐟	𝐝 −𝐝𝐢𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧	𝐚𝐧𝐝	|𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒂 |𝑰 = 	𝒏𝑰	,	 the number of hash function 𝐤𝐨𝐩𝐭 and hash functions 𝐇𝐢 and 𝒎𝒐𝒑𝒕𝑨𝒍𝒍 	length of expected  𝑪𝑩𝑭 
Output: updated 𝑪𝑩𝑭  
1. function UpdateCBF(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎8, 𝑘LMN, 𝐻j,𝑚LMN$££ ) 
2.   𝐶𝐵𝐹= bit vector of length 𝑚LMN$££  where all values are 0. 
3.   for i = 1 to d do 
4.       𝐻j(𝑎j) = ÀℎjÁ(𝑎j)ÂÁ∈{C,,…,wGHI}             ▷calculate hash result for each dimension 
5.   end for 
6.    for i = 0 to d-1 do 
7.          𝑋jÁ = ÀℎÁj(𝑎j)ÂÁ∈{C,,…,wGHI}                 ▷creates index data point 
8.          𝐶𝐵𝐹 (𝑋jÁ) = 1; 
9.      end for 
11. return 𝐶𝐵𝐹;  
12. end function 
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5.2.2. OPSU operation on encrypted CBF matrix 
 
In this section, we describe how to compute the set union using the CBF matrix. The 
homomorphic set union is computed in the cloud side using Algorithm 5-3 and is also shown 
in Figure 9. Here, the function is responsible for computing the set union of  all 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹, here 
in the following example, we explain when the number of 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹s is 2. Thus, the function 
takes two CBF matrices, 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹$ and 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹% as an input as per our setting with the length 
of each encrypted CBF 𝑚LMN$ 	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑚LMN%  respectively. The false positive probability of the 
union can be computed using the Equation (8). The false positive rate of 𝑓𝑝Å%Æ$ ∪	𝑓𝑝Å%Æ%  is 
always higher than 𝑓𝑝Å%Æ$ 	and	𝑓𝑝Å%Æ% . 𝑓𝑝Å%Æ$ ∪	𝑓𝑝Å%Æ% =	 
È1 − 𝑒{	wGHIxGHI FGHI	 ,FGHI ,…,FGHIJÉ ÊwGHI ×	È1 − 𝑒{	wGHIxGHI FGHI	 ,FGHI ,…,FGHIJÉ ÊwGHI 			          (8) 
 
Algorithm 5-2: Data owner algorithm creating an encrypted CBF matrix 
Input: CBF returned from Algorithm 5-1 and FHE secret key sk 
Output: Encrypted CBF matrix EncCBF 
1. function CreateEncryptedCBF(s𝑘, 𝐶𝐵𝐹) 
2.         𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹 = new p bit array of ciphertexts; 
3.    for i = 0 to p-1 do 
4.        for j= 0 to 𝑚LMN$££ -1 do 
5.              𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝑠𝑘, 𝐶𝐵𝐹[𝑖][𝑗]); 
6.         end for 
7.      end for 
8. return 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹; 
9. end function 
Algorithm 5-3: Cloud server algorithm computing union to create new CBF matrix 
Input: two encrypted CBF matrix	𝑬𝒏𝒄𝑪𝑩𝑭𝑨 	𝒂𝒏𝒅	𝑬𝒏𝒄𝑪𝑩𝑭𝑩 of length 𝒎𝒐𝒑𝒕𝑨 	𝒂𝒏𝒅	𝒎𝒐𝒑𝒕𝑩 	𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐲 
Output: single union of Encrypted CBF matrix, 𝑬𝒏𝒄𝑪𝑩𝑭∪𝑨𝒍𝒍  
1.  function  EncryptedCBFUnion(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹$,𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹𝑀%)  
2.       𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹∪$££= new p element array of ciphertext 
3.  for i=0 to 𝑚LMN$ -1 
4.      for j= 0 to 𝑚LMN% -1 
5.         𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹∪$££=𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹$ 𝕆ℝ 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹%; 
6.     end for 
7.  end for 
8.  return 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹∪$££; 
9.  end function 
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5.2.3. Processing the query on the cloud  
After the computation of the set union on dataset A and dataset B owned by data owner A and 
data owner B, respectively, upon querier Q’s request, the cloud processes the query to check if 
the queried element exists in the set or not. In this section, retrieval of the result is performed 
in the cloud side using the Algorithm 5-4. The function requires a set of queries {𝑞C,… , 𝑞O} ∈𝑞  and a set of the same hash functions as in Algorithm 5-1 𝐻j(𝑎j) =ÀℎCC(𝑎C), ℎC(𝑎C),… , ℎjÁ(𝑎j)Â as an input. Furthermore, we expect the array of encrypted bit 
vector result 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏Ö×ØÙ£N , which is defined in Table 2-1. The general method of querying the 
cloud server S is the same as the method in Section 2.4.2. 
 
 
Algorithm 5-4: Cloud server algorithm for processing query 
Input: CBF matrix, set of a query q = {𝒒𝟏, … , 𝒒𝒊} and Hash functions 𝑯𝒊 
Output: Encrypted array of a bit vector 𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒃𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕 
1.  function ObtainQueryResult(𝐶𝐵𝐹, 𝑞,𝐻j) 
2.  𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏Ö×ØÙ£N= array of 𝑘LMN number of encrypted bit vector result 
3.  𝑌jÁ = array of 𝑘LMN number of data index points 
4.     for i = 0 to d-1 do 
5.  													𝐻j(𝑞j) = ÀℎjÁ(𝑞j)ÂÁ∈{C,,…,wGHI}    ▷calculate hash result for each dimension        
6.     end for 
7.     for i = 0 to d-1 do 
8.           𝑌jÁ = ÀℎÁj(𝑞j)ÂÁ∈{C,,…,wGHI}                 ▷creates query index data point 
9.      end for 
10.       for q = 0 to 𝑌jÁ-1 
11.                  Indx1 = first element of the qth index array of 𝑌jÁ 
12.                  Indx2 = second element of the qth index array of 𝑌jÁ 
13.                          𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏Ö×ØÙ£N  = CBF[Indx1][Indx2]; 
14.        end for          
15.  return 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏Ö×ØÙ£N ;                   ▷returns the array of encrypted bit vector 
16.  end function 
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Input: Dataset 𝑫𝑨 of size 𝒏𝑨 and Dataset 𝑫𝑩 of size 𝒏𝑩 
Output: Result of 𝑫𝑨 ∪ 𝑫𝑩 based on Q’s query 
1. Cloud Server S sets up the upper bound dataset size 𝑛LMN 
2. Initialization: Querier Q performs the following: 
[Creates FHE parameters] Generates a secret key sk and cloud key ek: 
Setup(1λ , 1Ý)→params;  KeyGen(params)	→ 𝑠𝑘, 𝑒𝑘; 
                [Set  𝒇𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒕] Decides an optimal false positive rate 𝑓𝑝LMN   for a CBF matrix. 
  [Send the parameters] Sends the parameters to Data owners A and B and S. 
3. Data Owner Setup and Data Outsourcing ∀	𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎8 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, perform the following:  
[Create BF parameters] Calculates	𝑚LMNj , 	𝑖 =1,..,d and 𝑘LMN from 𝑓𝑝LMN  and 𝑛LMN  
[Create ABFs] Creates Bloom filters for each attribute 𝑖 of 	𝑚LMNj  size and creates d 
ABF matrix: 	{𝐴𝐵𝐹C, … , 𝐴𝐵𝐹O}	in which all values are set to 0 
[Create CBFs] Creates Bloom filter matrix by obtaining the cartesian products on all 
d ABF matrix: 
                                     𝐶𝐵𝐹 =	𝐴𝐵𝐹C × …× 𝐴𝐵𝐹O                            [Equation (3)] 
The values of 𝐶𝐵𝐹 matrix is all set to 0.  
[Insert items in CBF] Insert items into a 𝐶𝐵𝐹 
              UpdateCBF(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎8, 𝑘LMN, 𝐻j,𝑚LMN$££ )                 [Algorithm 5-1] 
[Encrypt CBFs] Encrypts the CBF and creates encrypted CBF:  
                           CreateEncryptedCBF(s𝑘, 𝐶𝐵𝐹)              [Algorithm 5-2] 
[Send encrypted CBFs]  Sends the encrypted CBF matrix to the server S 𝑆 ← 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹	 
4. Cloud Server Set Union Operation  
[Compute Set Union on encrypted CBFs] Compute union of the encrypted CBF 
matrix owned by data owner A and data owner B:  𝑆: 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹∪$££ ←   EncryptedCBFUnion(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹$,𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹%)      [Algorithm 5-3] 
[Search query]   𝑆: 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐶𝐵𝐹Ö×ØÙ£N ←  ObtainQueryResult(𝐶𝐵𝐹, 𝑞, 𝐻j)                      [Algorithm 5-4] 
[Send result] Sends the resulting encrypted 𝑘LMN	array bit vector result to Q:  𝑆 → 𝑄:	𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏Ö×ØÙ£N 
5. Querier result retrieving ∀ {𝑞C, … , 𝑞O} ∈ 𝑞 
[Decrypt the encrypted result] Obtains the result from the cloud and performs 
decryption. 𝑄:	𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏Ö×ØÙ£N, 𝑠𝑘) 
Figure 8: Our Protocol 
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5.3. Security Proof  
In this section, we discuss about the security of our protocol.  In the protocol, the cloud is 
assumed to be honest-but-curious. The cloud does not learn any information on the data or the 
query results since all the data are encrypted. Therefore, the cloud cannot perform any 
decryption. Similarly, the data owner A and data owner B does not learn each other’s data 
contents. In addition, our model assumes that the cloud server does not collude with any parties, 
thus, the querier  learns only the result. Thus, the security requirements for each party in our 
model are satisfied.  
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6. EVALUATION 
6.1. Implementation  
We implemented our protocol as shown in Figure 8 using C++. For creation of Cartesian-join 
of Bloom filter (CBF) and item insertion in it, MurmurHash3 [22] was used in order to generate 
hash functions, we implemented them by ourselves using the library. Further, for fast fully 
homomorphic encryption using torus (TFHE) [6], we used TFHE library version 1.0 [21]. The 
current version supports evaluation of  Boolean circuit in gate bootstrapping mode only in a 
single threaded mode. In addition, it sets constant parameters, throughout our experiment we 
used the  same parameters described as in the library which is included in Table 6-1. 
Although our scenario has four parties such as data owner A,  data owner B, cloud server S and 
a querier Q, same machine was used to run experiments. The machine runs on 64-bit CentOS 
6, Intel Core i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz x 8, and 15.6 GiB memory and Disk size 983.4 GB, 
using a single thread. 
Table 6-1 Parameters of TFHE 
 
 
In Table 6-1, N is number of slots over 𝕋, 𝕋á[𝑋]is the polynomial message space which is 
used as an input for homomorphic bootstrapped OR gate. 𝛼 is the standard deviation which 
represents maximum noise and l is a security parameter. 
 The current version of the library does not support ciphertext packing and batching, so we 
encrypt all the element in the single batch. Additionally, in this version of TFHE parameters 
are only implemented for about 128 bit of security parameter.  
 
6.2. Experimental Evaluation 
In this section we evaluate the experiment results of our protocol. We measured the execution 
time for each party and communication size for data owners and querier only, to evaluate the 
performance of our protocol. Each experimental measurement is evaluated in average 10 trails.  
 
Our protocol involves four parties, however, the same algorithm is used for the execution of 
both Data owner A and Data owner B, thus, the experimental result such as computation time, 
communication time and communication size are considered same among data owners . In our 
scenario querier initializes the key set up and distributes it to the data owners and the cloud. 
Since, TFHE scheme uses symmetric key encryption, querier generates two keys. Among 
𝑁 𝛼 l 𝕋á[𝑋] 
1024 0.012467 128 [−18 , 18	] 
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which, the querier distributes the evaluation key, ek, to the cloud and the secret key, sk, to the 
data owners.  
 
The key initialization takes 1.677 sec in average, similarly, average time taken for the 
encryption and decryption are 50 msec and 67 msec respectively using the TFHE algorithm. 
All the FHE parameters used in the experiment is mentioned in Table 6-1, they are set by the 
library itself. For our experiments, we prepared two datasets with variant sizes for each attribute 
of a dataset which is shown in Table 6-2 . 
 
Table 6-1 Dataset sizes of Data owner A and B  
 
 
 
Table 6-3 shows average computation time, communication size and communication time on 
each party, where dataset size varying up to 50 elements. Figure 9 shows the computation time 
of the each party: encryption of the CBF matrix on the data owner, computation of the set union 
of the CBF matrix on the cloud server and the querier obtaining and decrypting the query result. 
Since, current TFHE version that is used for implementation does not support the ciphertext 
packing and batching, it results larger computation time in the CBF matrix encryption in data 
owner. Further, Figure 10 shows the communication size on the data owner and querier. 
 
6.2.1. Evaluation on each party 
All the experiment for each party is performed in only single thread. 
Data Owner: The experimental result on the data owner is obtained from the Algorithm 5-1 
and Algorithm 5-2 which is shown in Figure 8. In this experiment, false positive, 𝑓𝑝LMN  , is set 
as 0.001 and 𝑛LMN as 100. From the given 𝑓𝑝LMN   and 𝑛LMN fixed length of each attribute bloom 
filter, 	𝑚LMNj  and 𝑘LMN are determined. Thus, increase in the execution time in the data owner is 
almost linear. Moreover, the computation time, communication time required for uploading 
encrypted CBF matrix to the cloud server and communication size is shown in Table 6-3.  
Cloud Server: The experimental result on the cloud server is obtained from the Algorithm 5-3 
and Algorithm 5-4 which is shown in Figure 8. Additionally, Figure 9 shows clear process on 
the computation of union in the cloud side. Here, we perform row-by-row bit operation on the 
two CBF matrix outsourced by data Owner A and data Owner B. Thus, the computation of the 
cloud side increases linearly with the increase in the size of the CBF matrix, 	𝑚LMN$££  . Moreover, 
the output of the union is always stored as a single ciphertext. 
Querier: The querier side has the lowest computational overhead as it only involves in 
obtaining the result and decryption, and the result is always obtained in the encrypted bit vector. 
Number of attributes (dimension d)=2 
Dataset size 5 15 35 50 
  
 
23 
The computation time, communication time required for retrieving the result from the cloud 
and communication size is shown in Table 6-3.   
 
 
  
 
Figure 9: Computation time in each party 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Communication size in data sent from Cloud server to the Querier and Data 
Owner to the Cloud Server 
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Table 6-2 Computation, Communication time and Communication size of each party 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 Party 
Each dataset size (Data owner A and B) 
5 ×	5 20 ×	20 35 × 35 50 ×	50 
Computation 
Time [s] 
Data Owner 37.26 35.49 50.57 214.09 
Cloud Server 32.79 31.20 37.26 75.90 
Querier 4.38 7.072 16.66 27.20 
Communication 
Size [MB] 
Data Owner -> Cloud 
Server 2.1 2.1 2.5 5 
Cloud Server -> Querier 0.0645 0.104 0.245 0.403 
Communication 
Time [s] 
Data Owner -> Cloud 
Server 17.216 19.461 38.486 76.66 
Cloud Server -> Querier 0.083 0.199 0.396 0.86 
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7. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we proposed a protocol which allows query search on the outsourced multi-
attribute union datasets, using bloom filter variant CBF matrix which enables the filter to verify 
the relation among the attributes adopting TFHE encryption scheme. The protocol requires the 
cloud to perform set union operation on the outsourced datasets first. After the computation of 
union, a new single union CBF matrix is produced. Then, upon querier’s query request, the 
cloud search the query on the union CBF matrix. During this process, the information of the 
source of the queried data is completely hidden. In our experiments, 76.66 sec is required to 
outsource 5 mb of 50 elements to the cloud. And, 301.04 sec to compute the set union of two 
datasets containing 100 elements. This computation time can be further reduced, using the next 
version of the TFHE library, which will support other functionalities such as packing, multi 
thread, while these are the limitation for the current version. Our protocol enables to compute 
set union on multi-attribute dataset using a CBF matrix without revealing any other information 
besides bit values using a FHE scheme. Thus, we believe that our study would help the practical 
applications dealing with the sensitive data. 
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